



Spectrum Auctions

CanWISP March 2019

Outline



- Auction Goals
- Auction Design Considerations
- Auction Formats
- Spectrum Auctions

Auction Goals



- Get the highest price
- Sell everything quickly
- Discover the "right" price
- Display of fairness
- Further a policy goal

Design Considerations



- Illegal bidding practices
 - Collusion
 - Cartel Bidding
- Mitigation
 - Pre-defined increments
 - Stiff Penalties
 - Full Transparency

Design Considerations



- Gaming
 - Sniping
 - Bid Shading
 - Jump Bidding
 - Shill Bidding
- Mitigation
 - Candle Auction or Activity Rules
 - Second-Price Rule
 - Pre-defined Bid Increments

Design Considerations



- Information
 - Anonymous Bidders
 - Anonymous Bids
 - Anonymous Sellers
 - Limited product information

Auction types



- Ascending auction
- Reverse auction
- Sealed-bid auction
- Descending auction
- Multiunit auction

Ascending Auction



- Price increments from bidders or from auctioneer
- Ongoing price information
- Can maximise price

Reverse Auction



- Buyer and Seller are reversed
- Has been used for funding awards in some countries
- Requires seller to precisely define the product

Sealed-Bid Auction



- One secret bid per bidder
- Fast
- No ongoing pricing information
- First-price or second-price

Descending Auction



- 1 item price descends
- Multi item Bidders
 submit quantity & price in sealed bids
- Fill orders from top down
- First or second price
- Fast clearing of large market

SMRA Auction



- Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending
- Multiple products (ex. licences)
- All auctioned at the same time
- At each round, auctioneer announces prices for each product
- If there is more than one bid for each product, the price is incremented
- Auction ends when supply = demand

Opening Bids



- 600 MHz auction
- Service Area 2-06
- Eastern Ontario and Outaouais
- Pop 2,435,880
- 270 Eligibility Points
- Opening bid for 10 MHz @
 \$0.539/MHz/pop = \$13,129,000

Opening Bids



- 600 MHz auction \$/MHz/pop
 - \$0.133 North
 - \$0.360 Rural
 - \$0.539 AB / BC / East ON
 - \$0.804 South ON / South QC

Opening Bids



- 2 GHz AWS-3 auction (2015) \$/MHz/pop
 - \$0.05 North
 - \$0.06 NL, NS, NB, SK
 - \$0.08 East QC, East ON
 - \$0.09 MN, AB
 - \$0.10 BC
 - \$0.11 South ON
 - \$0.12 South QC


SMRA - Activity Rules



- Each licence is assigned an opening price and eligibility points
- Initial deposit is opening price (\$/point)
- Bidder's initial eligibility equals the points of the deposit
- Each bid has an associated number of eligibility points
- Bidder's eligibility is reduced as bids are reduced

Revealed Preference Rule






Points parking

Orphan Licences






Combinatorial Clock Auction




- Bid on packages, not individual licences
- Like products are grouped
- Three stages
 - Clock Rounds
 - Supplementary Round
 - Assignment Round


CCA Format













Category 2: Spoons \$0.10 each





Category 3: Saucers \$0.20 each




Clock Rounds









	Category 1: Cups	Category 2: Spoons	Category 3: Saucers
1	\$0.20 : qty 12	\$0.10 : qty 12	\$0.20 : qty 12
2	\$0.50 : qty 10	\$0.30 : qty 9	\$0.50 : qty 8
3	\$1.00 : qty 8	\$0.60 : qty 6	\$0.80 : qty 7
4	\$1.30 : qty 6	\$0.80 : qty 4	\$1.10 : qty 5
5	\$1.50 : qty 4	\$0.80 : qty 4	\$1.20 : qty 3

Supplementary Rounds





- All participants may enter supplementary bid packages for different combinations
- Cannot exceed eligibility
- Winning combinations are solved to maximize total value

Vickrey Price




- Vickrey price is an extension of second price to multiple products and combinations
- With multiple products, this is an algorithm that solves for the price such that no other bidders would pay more.
- Winning bids announced as packages.

Assignment Rounds









Opportunity to express value of particular items within category

2015 AWS Auction



Licence Winner	Supp. Bids	Licences Won	Vickery Price Paid (\$M)	Final Clock Price (\$M)	Vickery / Clock
Bell	501	51	\$28.99	\$76.97	0.38
Eastlink	20	11	\$4.82	\$12.09	0.40
CCI	503	13	\$2.30	\$13.78	0.17
MTS	19	2	\$2.24	\$2.61	0.86
Rogers	195	41	\$24.09	\$73.49	0.33
TBayTel	5	2	\$1.73	\$1.73	1.00
TELUS	28	122	\$478.82	\$1,038.47	0.46
Vidéotron	6	18	\$186.95	\$440.05	0.42
Xplornet	29	42	\$25.44	\$64.39	0.40

Some Valuations



- 700 MHz auction (2014)
 - \$0.30 to \$13 /MHz/pop
 - Most \$1.50 to \$3.50 /MHz/pop

- Community of 20,000
- 20 MHz of spectrum
- @ \$2.50/MHz/pop

\$1,000,000

Some Valuations



- 2500 MHz BRS auction (2015)
 - Most < \$1.00 /MHz/pop
 - Tier-3 service areas
 - Not all licences available
- Community of 20,000
- 20 MHz of spectrum
- @ \$1.00/MHz/pop

\$400,000

Some Valuations



- AWS-3 auction (2015) CCA format
 - About \$0.20-\$0.30 /MHz/pop for setaside spectrum
 - About \$4 to \$10 /MHz/pop for open spectrum
- Community of 20,000
- 20 MHz of spectrum
- © \$0.25/MHz/pop

\$100,000

Looking Ahead



- 600 MHz auction results
- Tier-5 service areas
- ISED consideration of rural service
- 3 GHz spectrum plan and auction

